Regulating Knowledge Monopolies: The Case of the IPCC. ESRI WP350. September 2010 by Tol, Richard S.J.
  
 
www.esri.ie 
 
 
Working Paper No. 350 
 
September 2010 
 
Regulating Knowledge Monopolies: The Case of the IPCC 
Richard S.J. Tola,b,c,d 
Abstract: The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change has a monopoly on the 
provision of climate policy advice at the international level and a strong market position 
in national policy advice. This may have been the intention of the founders of the IPCC. 
I argue that the IPCC has a natural monopoly, as a new entrant would have to invest 
time and effort over a longer period to perhaps match the reputation, trust, goodwill, and 
network of the IPCC. The IPCC is a not-for-profit organization, and it is run by nominal 
volunteers; it therefore cannot engage in the price-gouging that is typical of monopolies. 
However, the IPCC has certainly taken up tasks outside its mandate; the IPCC has 
been accused of haughtiness; innovation is slow; quality may have declined; and the 
IPCC may have used its power to hinder competitors. There are all things that 
monopolies tend to do, against the public interest. The IPCC would perform better if it 
were regulated by an independent body which audits the IPCC procedures and 
assesses its performance; if outside organizations would be allowed to bid for the 
production of reports and the provision of services under the IPCC brand; and if policy 
makers would encourage potential competitors to the IPCC. 
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 Regulating Knowledge Monopolies: The Case of the IPCC 
 
1. Introduction 
The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) is a runaway success. From humble 
beginnings in the late 1980s, it is now seen by many national and subnational governments as the 
ultimate authority on scientific matters on climate change (Agrawala 1998a;Agrawala 
1998b;Hulme and Mahony 2010;Nishioka 2008;Oppenheimer et al. 2007;Rothman et al. 2009). 
The IPCC was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize 2008. However, there has been criticism of the 
IPCC from November 2009 onwards (Hulme 2010;Kintisch 2010;McKitrick 2010;Nature 
2010;New Scientist 2010;Rosenthal 2010;Schiermeier 2010;The Economist 2010c;Wynne 
2010), the sharpness of which dwarfs earlier critique. This is to a large extent because of political 
opposition to climate policy,1 but I argue below that there are design flaws in the IPCC as well. I 
also offer remedies. 
Climate change succeeded acidification. Many academics and policy makers who used to work 
on acidification moved to climate change when acidification was “solved”. Some argue that the 
negotiations on acidifying substances did not succeed until after all parties had accepted a 
common, scientific understanding of the problem. International acidification policy is indeed 
informed by a single body of technocratic advice2 – a knowledge monopoly (Castells and 
Funtowicz 1997;Gough et al. 1998;Hordijk 1991;Hordijk 1995;Hordijk and Kroeze 1997). The 
formation of the IPCC was at least partly inspired by this example. 
Note that there is no reason to assume that knowledge monopolies are desirable. The nature of 
the policy advice on acidification was in turn inspired by the ideal of social planning as 
advocated by such leading economists as (Tinbergen 1952;Tinbergen 1954) – whose ideas are 
now seen as naïve by some (Nove 1983) and repugnant by others (Friedman and Friedman 
1980). Harry Truman’s wish for a one-handed economist is now understood to be mistaken 
(Economist 2003). The notion of a dispassionate scientist passing objective advice to a 
                                                            
1 Because greenhouse gas emission reduction is often (yet incorrectly) couched in terms of scientific necessity, 
opponents are led to attack the science and the scientific institutions. The debate was particularly vehement in the 
United Kingdom as the three main parties all called for stringent emission reduction, and the opposition was 
therefore unconstrained by (the prospect of) the responsibilities of government. 
2 The RAINS model, hosted at the International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis (Alcamo et al. 1990). 
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 benevolent policy maker has been thoroughly discredited (Funtowicz and Ravetz 1994;Pielke, Jr. 
2007). 
Few would argue that the IPCC is a secret world government in waiting. The IPCC has set itself 
the more modest goal of standardizing the academic knowledge on which climate policy is based 
across the world.3 This may be a mistaken goal. International negotiations succeed if all parties 
think they are better off (Barrett 1994;Carraro and Siniscalco 1998). There is no reason to 
believe that negotiations are easier if all parties share the same knowledge – in fact, the opposite 
may be true (Kamada and Kominers 2010;Ulph and Maddison 1997). 
However, this paper is not about whether the IPCC was a mistake. The IPCC exists and it will 
not cease to do so in the foreseeable future. This paper is about how to regulate the IPCC. There 
are a number of earlier papers on this, mostly from people who are against climate policy 
(Alexander 2007;Dawson 2008;Dawson 2009;Henderson 2007;Henderson 2009;Peiser 
2007;Zillman 2007) with a few exceptions (Solomon and Manning 2008;Terradas and Penuelas 
2008).4 In Section 2, I argue that the IPCC has a natural monopoly – regardless of the intentions 
of its founders, there can be only one IPCC-like organization. In Section 3, I discuss some of the 
problems typically found in monopolistic markets, in this case the market for climate policy 
advice. In Section 4, I present solutions. Section 5 concludes. 
 
2. The IPCC as a natural monopoly 
Natural monopolies occur when there are substantial economies of scale or scope, or when the 
costs of fixed capital are large (Baumol et al. 1982;Sharkey 1982). Railroads and electricity 
distribution networks are examples of the latter. The costs of laying tracks and cables are so high 
that it does not pay off to have two or three competing networks. One network is the maximum 
the consumer is willing to pay for, and a monopoly is the result. Economies of scale or scope are 
another reason for natural monopolies to form. Waste collection is an example. It is far cheaper 
to collect all rubbish in a street with a single truck than to let one truck serve some houses and 
another truck the remaining ones. Waste is therefore best collected by a monopoly. 
                                                            
3 http://www.ipcc.ch/organization/organization.htm 
4 There is a substantial discussion on the much narrower topic of communication of uncertainty in IPCC reports 
(Berg and Tschirhart 1988;Budescu et al. 2009;Moss and Schneider 2000;Risbey and Kandlikar 2007). 
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 Strictly speaking, a monopoly is natural if the costs of having multiple providers are larger than 
the benefits of competition. As there are little data available, I cannot prove that the IPCC has a 
natural monopoly. Nonetheless, the IPCC shares some of the characteristics of a natural 
monopoly. There is large fixed cost of setting up a global organization to assess the literature on 
climate change to inform national and international policy. This cost is neither physical (e.g., 
water pipes) nor financial (e.g., equity), but rather in terms of reputation, trust and goodwill, and 
in terms of networks and institutional knowledge. It took the IPCC years to build up its current 
position. A new entrant in the market of climate policy advice would need a similar investment 
in quality and relationships before it can begin to compete with the IPCC. 
The IPCC is also favoured by network economies. The IPCC relies on more-or-less voluntary 
contributions of the academics who serve as its authors. These authors are rewarded with 
prestige, networking opportunities, access to decision makers, and influence.5 As the incumbent, 
the IPCC offers plenty of each. A new entrant would offer little. The IPCC is thus a natural 
monopsony on the input market for expertise.6 As the IPCC ultimately derives its status as a 
policy advisor from the reputation of its contributors, this natural monopsony implies a natural 
monopoly. 
Therefore, the IPCC has something that is akin to a natural monopoly. 
 
3. Typical problems of monopolies 
In the standard model, monopolies restrict supply to drive up the price and extract supernormal 
profits. Monopoly rents are readily detectable, and thus targeted by regulators. Regulated 
monopolies therefore often have excessive costs (e.g., large number of staff, high wages) or 
cross-subsidize another part of the same company – financed through the abuse of monopoly 
power. Monopolies may also reduce the quality of their product or service, while offering it at 
the same price. Monopolies also tend to innovate less – as there is no competition to stay ahead 
of. Such practices are harder to detect (Baumol et al. 1982;Sharkey 1982). 
                                                            
5 IPCC authorship also offers opportunities to travel and earn per diems, which is particularly valuable to scholars 
from developing countries. 
6 Alternatively, one could see the IPCC as a club, and authorship as a club good. As the IPCC is the only significant 
club, this does not affect the reasoning below. 
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 The root of the problem is that monopolies act in the interest of the company only, and that they 
can get away with it. Competitive firms too only consider their own bottom line – but they have 
to deliver good value to their clients lest they walk away. Customers of monopolies cannot 
switch to a different supplier (by definition), and monopolies therefore do not need to heed their 
wishes to the same extent as a competitive firm does. 
The IPCC is a knowledge monopoly, and it shares some of the characteristics of the behaviour of 
a typical monopolist. Obviously, the IPCC does not charge for its services, and therefore is not 
engaged in price gouging. The IPCC does not employ many people either, nor can it splash out 
on fancy offices. Authors and officials have used the IPCC to advance their own careers, but that 
would have happened in any case. 
However, the IPCC does use its brand to branch out into areas outside its core mandate. While 
the IPCC was set-up to assess the research on climate change, it has also engaged in primary 
research on scenario building (Nakicenovic and Swart 2001), standard setting (Schimel et al. 
1996), monitoring,7 and research funding.8 The IPCC is not particularly well-suited for these 
activities, and one may argue that it would have failed in these tasks had it not been for a cross-
subsidy in kind (goodwill, reputation, trust). 
The IPCC has moved into the territory of academia (e.g., MIT), UN agencies (e.g., UNEP) and 
Bretton Woods institutions (e.g., World Bank) with regard to scenario building; of the Subsidiary 
Body on Scientific and Technical Advice and the Secretariat of the UN Framework Convention 
on Climate Change with regard to standards and monitoring; and of public, private, and 
multilateral research financers and capacity builders with regard to research funding. 
The IPCC has used its monopoly power to branch out into scenario building. The resulting 
scenarios have been severely criticized (Castles and Henderson 2003a;Castles and Henderson 
2003b;Girod et al. 2009;Gruebler et al. 2004;O'Neill et al. 2008;O'Neill and Nakicenovic 
2008;Pielke, Jr. et al. 2008), but AR4 glossed over the problems (Fisher et al. 2007). As 
complaints by referees were ignored, this can only be characterized as a deliberate 
misrepresentation of the literature – a violation of the IPCC mandate. Arguably, the IPCC used 
its role as an assessor of the literature to protect its role as a builder of scenarios. 
                                                            
7 http://www.ipcc-nggip.iges.or.jp/ 
8 http://www.ipcc.ch/ipcc-scholarship-programme/ipcc_scholarshipprogramme.html 
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 The IPCC scenarios are more widely used than any of the alternatives. This is true for the 
climatological literature, the impact literature, and the emission reduction literature. This is 
partly because standardization of scenarios enables comparison of results; and partly because the 
IPCC reports are more likely to refer to papers that use IPCC scenarios. A rational researcher 
would therefore use the dominant scenarios – that is, those of the IPCC. The scenarios run with 
the large-scale climate models are coordinated with the IPCC. Therefore, the IPCC has used its 
monopoly position in the market for assessment to establish a dominant position in the market 
for scenarios. 
One may also argue that the quality of the IPCC reports has declined over time, another 
characteristic of a monopoly. This is hard to measure. AR4 certainly received far more negative 
attention than AR3 – but that may also be because expectations have risen or the political climate 
has hardened. And parts of AR2 were strongly criticized too, on the “discernible human 
influence on global climate” (Edwards and Schneider 2001;Lindzen 1997) and on the monetary 
value of mortality risks (Bruce 1996;Courtney 1996;Grubb 1996;Pearce 1995a;Pearce 
1995b;Pearce 1995c). The response of the IPCC to (alleged) errors in its emissions scenarios and 
the AR4, and to (alleged) conflicts of interest can be described as haughty (The Economist 
2003a;The Economist 2003b;The Economist 2010a;The Economist 2010b), which may be 
inspired by the knowledge that the IPCC has captive clients. 
The IPCC has not innovated much. An author of AR1 would instantly recognize the methods, 
procedures, and structure of AR4. Things have changed, of course, but at the margin. This is 
perhaps the strongest sign that the IPCC is a monopoly. Since AR1, our understanding of the 
climate problem has changed dramatically. New technologies have emerged that drastically 
change the way people interact (e.g., blogs) and knowledge is disseminated and created (e.g., 
wikis) – while the internet brought access to unprecedented amounts of information. Yet, the 
IPCC still works with small teams of authors who fly to faraway cities to draft a chapter. Once 
finished, the chapter is fixed (Nature 2010). IPCC reports are the received wisdom flowing 
unidirectionally from the experts to the lay people (Beck 2010). The IPCC has largely avoided 
meta-analytical techniques, although the literature has grown fast since AR1 (Kuik et al. 
2009;Parmesan and Yohe 2003;Root et al. 2003;Tavoni and Tol 2010;van den Bergh et al. 
1997). For some IPCC chapters in AR4, none of the authors seemed to have had access to 
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 specialized academic databases and search tools.9 The IPCC has made little use of tools for 
online collaboration and communication, nor of transparency-enhancing software (e.g., 
automated versioning of documents). 
 
4. Regulating knowledge monopolies 
It is often best to break up monopolies. However, this is not the case for natural monopolies. 
Natural monopolies should be regulated (Beck 2010;Berg and Tschirhart 1988;Train 
1991;Waterson 1988). In Section 2, I argue (but cannot prove) that the IPCC has a natural 
monopoly. If so, the IPCC should be regulated rather than broken up. 
Appropriate regulation of monopolies begins with the questions which part of the production and 
distribution process is a natural monopoly and why. In electricity, the network is a natural 
monopoly – but power generation and distribution and even network maintenance are contestable 
markets. Transaction costs may (have) justify (justified) vertical integration (in times past) 
(Tirole 2000), but are not necessarily offset by the welfare losses of a monopoly that is more 
extensive than needed. 
There are three types of regulations that have been used to mitigate the negative effects of 
monopolies – that is, the regulator makes sure that the monopolist does not abuse its power. 
First, the conduct of monopolies is often tightly regulated. Price controls are a classic example. 
Second, if there cannot be competition in the market, there can be competition for the market. 
Concessions for waste collection in a particular area or rail services on a certain line can be sold 
to the highest bidder. Concessions are temporary monopolies. If the company that won the 
concession does not perform well, another company takes over after a few years. 
Third, monopolies are in principle threatened by new entrants. This argument is often made with 
regard to dominant ICT companies: a smart kid in a garage can revolutionize the sector. The 
regulator can therefore keep a monopolist in check by lowering the barriers to entry and by 
threatening to switch supplier.10 
These types of regulations can be applied to the IPCC as well. 
                                                            
9 For example, (Barker et al. 2007) find only one peer-reviewed paper on the impact of climate policy on 
employment while (Patuelli et al. 2005) find 94 papers. 
10 This would not be a credible threat in the case of a natural monopoly and a benevolent regulator. It can be an 
effective threat if the monopolist is unsure about the true intentions of the regulator and the naturalness of the 
monopoly is debatable, as in the case of the IPCC.  
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 The IPCC has abused its monopoly on assessment to establish a firm grip on the field of long-
term scenario building, and has done a poor job (see above). The IPCC should withdraw from 
scenario development.11 
With regard to standard setting, the IPCC has not been particularly forceful in pointing out the 
difficulties with global warming potentials (Godal 2003;O'Neill 2000;Shine et al. 2005;Smith 
2003). While the IPCC is not responsible for the decision (2/CP.3) of the Conference of the 
Parties12 to use the global warming potentials of AR2, the IPCC should loudly protest against 
this in AR5 – in fact, it should have protested in AR3 and AR4. 
I am not aware of any issues with the IPCC’s involvement in monitoring. The IPCC scholarship 
programme is brand new, but there is a risk that IPCC scholars will get preferential treatment in 
the selection of IPCC authors. It would therefore be better if the IPCC outsourced this to another 
organization. 
Conduct regulation can help to improve outcomes in natural monopoly markets. At present, the 
IPCC is governed as follows.13 IPCC Members meet once a year in a General Assembly. This is 
the meeting of the clients and sponsors of the IPCC, and its ultimate governing body. Day-to-day 
affairs are delegated to the IPCC Bureau, which combines the roles of an executive, a policy-
maker, and an auditor.14 The Bureau has three key advantages over the General Assembly: The 
Bureau has privileged access to information about the IPCC; Bureau members spend 
considerably more time and effort on the IPCC than do General Assembly members; and Bureau 
members therefore have more at stake than do General Assembly members. The Bureau 
therefore has de facto the upper hand over the General Assembly, the de jury governing body. 
This situation is not unique. National parliaments face the same problem in all aspects of 
regulation. Non-executive members of company boards are in the same situation. The standard 
solution is the creation of a regulatory agency, whose mandate is to check whether industry stays 
within the rules and, occasionally, whether the rules induce the desired outcome. Auditors fulfill 
                                                            
11 The Integrated Assessment Modeling Consortium, http://www.iamconsortium.org/, is a front organization of the 
IPCC, at least if it comes to scenario development. 
12 http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/cop3/07a01.pdf 
13 http://www.ipcc.ch/organization/organization.htm 
14 The governance of the IPCC would be much improved if the IPCC Chair and Working Group Chairs would be 
removed from the IPCC Bureau to form a true executive; and the IPCC Bureau would be reformed as an 
independent board under a strong chair. 
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 this role in corporations. At present, such auditing of the IPCC is done through a number of ad 
hoc activities,15 but this should be regularized. 
The regulatory agency should audit the procedural aspects of the IPCC. However, it should also 
assess the performance of the IPCC, drawing on the experience with evaluating the performance 
of university departments. It could consider such issues as the selection of the IPCC authors.16 
Are they really top experts in their fields (controlling for geographical representation)? It could 
randomly select (parts of) IPCC chapters and see whether they truly reflect the balance of the 
literature – e.g., by comparison with recent survey articles. It should compare the outlines of 
IPCC report to the issues discussed in the literature, checking whether the IPCC gives undue 
weight to certain topics while ignoring other ones. It could monitor the impact of IPCC reports, 
both on the academic literature and on national and international policies. 
As debates within the IPCC are often highly specialized and hard to follow for outsiders, the 
regulatory agency should make a particular effort to facilitate and protect potential 
whistleblowers. 
The regulatory agency could be a body of the IPCC General Assembly, a joint venture of the 
mother organizations of the IPCC (the World Meteorological Organization and the United 
Nations Environment Programme), a permanent committee of the InterAcademy Council, or part 
of a newly established World Environment Organization. In the last cases, this regulatory agency 
could also supervise other international policy assessments. Care would need to taken that the 
regulators are sufficiently independent.  
At present, the people who control the IPCC are regularly replaced. One could therefore argue 
that there is already competition for the market. This is not the case, however. Competition for 
the market requires that there is competitive bidding between rival entities – and that the 
concession is awarded to the offer with the best price/quality characteristics. The changing of the 
IPCC guard is done in backroom deals. In the future, there could be competitive bidding for the 
working group chairs and technical support units, as well as for the IPCC board. National 
governments have considerable domestic experience with this, and there are precedents at the 
international level as well: the Olympic Games and the FIFA World Cup. 
                                                            
15 For example, the review by the InterAcademy Council: http://reviewipcc.interacademycouncil.net/ 
16 Note that the IPCC authors are nominated by governments. In a number of instances, governments have 
nominated people to the IPCC for their political colour rather than their expertise. The nomination process should be 
audited too, and the IPCC should have the right to appoint non-nominated authors too. 
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 A more radical alternative is the following. Rich IPCC members could pay an annual 
contribution, from which the technical support units are paid. Staff would be international, and 
less beholden to one particular sponsor government. The OECD, World Bank, and IMF operate 
in this manner. 
Competition for the market could be extended further. If someone feels that there is a product 
missing from the range on offer by the IPCC, then that person should be allowed to bid for the 
use of the IPCC brand on such a report. Obviously, the report should meet the IPCC quality 
standards and comply with IPCC procedures. Currently, something similar is done through the 
IPCC Special Reports, but these originate from within the IPCC. There is no reason why the 
IPCC should not consider proposals for Special Reports from outside. In fact, allowing this 
would keep the authors and organizers of “regular” IPCC reports on their toes. 
The prospect of competition, rather than competition itself, would also keep the IPCC on its toes. 
Unfortunately, this is not really an option. The international academies lack the resources, the 
mandate, and probably the ambition. Domestically, the national academies would be the logical 
choice to write a second opinion – but only the US National Academies17 may have the 
resources to organize an assessment at the scale of the IPCC. Any national assessment would 
suffer from a lack of legitimacy in other countries – cf. the cool reception of the Stern Review 
(Stern et al. 2006) outside Europe.18 Nevertheless, national assessments should be made widely 
available, e.g., by translation from Russian and Chinese to English. 
While it would be hard for a single organization to compete with the entirety of the IPCC, 
competition on specific aspects is much easier. The World Meteorological Organization could 
review atmospheric science (WMO 2006), the World Health Organization the health impacts of 
climate change (McMichael et al. 2003;WHO 1990). The World Bank and the OECD could 
review the emission reduction policies and their costs (Bosi et al. 2010;Dellink et al. 2010), 
while national institutions could assess the impacts of climate change (Karl, Melillo, and 
Peterson 2009; BACC Author Team 2008). While such activities are ongoing, they often draw 
on the same people as the IPCC and are frequently not even intended to be independent. 
The private sector would have the means, but the parties that would have the keenest interest to 
organize and finance an alternative assessment would suffer from a lack of trust for that very 
                                                            
17 http://dels-old.nas.edu/climatechange/ 
18 This may also be explained by the poor quality of the Stern Review (Arrow 2007;Mendelsohn 2006;Nordhaus 
2007;Weitzman 2007). 
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 reason.19 Publishers would be the exception. The IPCC reports have been a commercial success 
too, and competitors to its house publisher have no doubt been eyeing the same market. And 
there has indeed been somewhat of a proliferation of IPCC-like publications.20 However, no full-
blown alternative has been published (or is planned), but this may well happen should the IPCC 
lose more of its credibility. Climate policy makers should encourage these developments, but 
few if any do. 
Self-organization is the third, potential new entrant that could threaten the IPCC’s monopoly. 
Wikipedia is the best known example, and it already covers all the topics that the IPCC does. 
Wikipedia, however, lacks focus and it does not have the credibility and legitimacy of the IPCC. 
Many of the climate entries on Wikipedia are of low quality and balance is sometimes difficult to 
discern.21 There have been attempts to create quality-controlled alternatives to Wikipedia aimed 
at academic audiences,22 but these have not taken off – which is not to say that they could not. 
Any new wiki struggles with critical mass: Why would anyone contribute to something so small? 
For a climate wiki, this problem is easily overcome: Wikify AR4 and a few good textbooks. This 
would create critical mass. For the sake of competition, this should be supported. By way of 
experiment, this should be done by an IPCC-controlled wiki, a quality-controlled wiki (e.g., 
Scholarpedia), and an open wiki (e.g., Wikipedia). 
 
5. Discussion and conclusion 
The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change has a monopoly on the provision of climate 
policy advice at the international level and a strong market position in national policy advice. 
There is reason to believe that this was the intention of the founders of the IPCC; one can also 
make the case that the IPCC has a natural monopoly. A new entrant would have to make a 
considerable investment in time and effort over a number of years to try and match the 
reputation, trust, goodwill, and network of the IPCC. The IPCC is a not-for-profit organization 
                                                            
19 A poor example is the Non-governmental International Panel on Climate Change http://www.nipccreport.org/, 
while the Copenhagen Consensus on Climate is of higher repute (Lomborg 2010) 
20 For example, the Wiley Interdisciplinary Review on Climate Change 
http://wires.wiley.com/WileyCDA/WiresJournal/wisId-WCC.html,the Encyclopedia of Earth 
http://www.eoearth.org/ and the Encyclopedia of Life Support Systems http://www.eolss.net  
21 This is based on a reading of Wikipedia entries in areas of or adjacent to my expertise. Wikipedia has better 
quality with regard to mathematics and economics than for climate change. I have given up editing Wikipedia on 
issues relating to climate change. 
22 See for example http://www.scholarpedia.org/ and http://www.scitopics.com/  
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 run by nominal volunteers and therefore cannot engage in the price-gouging that is typical of 
monopolies. However, the IPCC has certainly extended its remit; many have accused the IPCC 
of haughtiness; innovation is slow; quality may have declined; and the IPCC may have used its 
power to hinder competitors – all things that monopolies tend to do, and none of which is in the 
public interest. The IPCC would perform better if it were regulated by an independent body 
which audits the IPCC procedures and assesses its performance; if outside organizations would 
be allowed to bid for the production of IPCC reports and the provision of IPCC services; and if 
would-be competitors to the IPCC would be encouraged. 
This paper is based on the concept that the IPCC is a supplier in the market for policy advice. 
Non-economists may well have a different perspective on the interface between science and 
policy and on the role of organizations like the IPCC in that process. It would be interesting to 
see whether that would lead to similar conclusions on the need and nature of IPCC reform. 
(PBL 2010) reviewed the contents of parts of AR4. It also recommends some procedural changes 
to the IPCC, particularly more staff to check drafts and a public log of errors. (Shapiro et al. 
2010) review the procedural aspects of the IPCC. They recommend that an IPCC executive 
should be created (see footnote 14), that the position of review editors should be strengthened, 
that the IPCC should put more effort into communications, and that the organization should 
become more transparent. While this would indeed improve the IPCC, these recommendations 
fall short of those derived here. 
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